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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
\
CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT,
]
)
Defendant and Appellant. ]

Case No. 960270-CA
Priority N o . 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL

STATEMENT

T h i s Court h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o U t a h C o d e A n n . § 7 8 2a-3(f)

(1996).
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E ISSUES A N D S T A N D A R D S O F R E V I E W

1.

Does defendant's brief comply with the requirements of

Anders and Clayton by adequately illustrating that defendant's
claims have no merit?
Once the court determines that the required elements of an
Anders brief are present, this Court will grant defendant's
counsel's request to withdraw and will affirm the conviction only
when the Court unanimously finds the issues presented are "wholly
frivolous."
2.

State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981).

Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution?

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law.
Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170,175 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

The review of

counsel's performance, however, is "highly deferential" to avoid
second guessing counsel's performance *on the basis of an
inanimate record." State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah
App. 1993).
3.

Was defendant denied due process as guaranteed by the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution?
Claims based on a denial of due process are questions of law
that the appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Adams, 83 0
P.2d 310, 312 (Utah App.), cert, dsnifid, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1992) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Addendum A contains that texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8
and 58-37a-5 (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with possession of a controlled
substance, cocaine, a second degree felony# possession of a
controlled substance, marijuana, a class A misdemeanor, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
2

violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 and 58-37a-5 (1996) (R. 45).

After the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress

evidence seized from defendant, defendant entered an
unconditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance, a class A misdemeanor, and attempted possession of a
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor

(R. 131-37).

The

court sentenced defendant to 45 days in the Washington County
Jail (R. 311) .
Unhappy with trial counsel's performance, defendant timely
filed a pro se notice of appeal (R. 161). The State appointed
current counsel to represent defendant in this appeal (R. 164).
Defendant has not contacted his current counsel regarding this
appeal and current counsel does not know defendant's whereabouts.
Appellant's Brief at 5.

Consequently, defendant's counsel is

unaware of any specific basis upon which defendant wishes to
pursue an appeal beyond a general dissatisfaction with his
representation at trial. Id.
Defendant's counsel reviewed the transcript and found
no non-frivolous basis upon which to appeal.

Id. at 5-6.

As a

result, on December 19, 1996, defendant's counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders V, California/ 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396

(1967) and State v, Clayton, 639 p.2d 168 (Utah 1981) ("Anders
3

brief").

The State moved to strike the brief for failing to

comply Anders and Clayton.
motion.

This Court granted the State's

This brief is in response to defendant's counsel's

corrected Anders brief,
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Acting on information garnered from three informants and
their own corroborating observations, law enforcement officers
arrested defendant after a pat-down search and subsequent search
incident to arrest revealed contraband (R. 76).
On April 2, 1994, Officers Montanez and Wright were
assisting St. George police during spring break festivities (R.
195).

At approximately 9:30 p.m. the officers noticed three

young men drinking beer near room 232 of the Motel 6 (R. 195-96,
218).

The officers determined that the young men were juveniles

and issued citations for consumption of alcohol by a minor (R.
196, 217). The juveniles bartered with the officers, exchanging
information regarding drug transactions that had occurred earlier
in the day for the dismissal of their citations (R. 196).
The juveniles informed the officers that earlier that day
they had seen a blue 4x4 pickup truck (possibly a Dodge Dakota)
with two men, slightly older than themselves, supplying and
selling different types of drugs (R. 197, 219). The truck had
4

been in the parking lot of the Motel 6 earlier that evening and
the juveniles expected the truck to return later and continue
with drug transactions (R. 197). The transactions would take
place either in room 232 of the Motel 6 or in the parking lot
just below the room (R. 198, 219). The juveniles seemed well
versed in street drug vernacular, bolstering their assertions
that they knew the individuals engaged in drug transactions (R.
218) .
The officers left the motel in order to procure a less
conspicuous automobile (R. 199). When the officers returned to
the Motel 6 at approximately 10:30 they discovered a blue 4x4
pickup parked perpendicularly to the parking spaces right below
room 232, just as the juveniles predicted (R. 200, 220) . The
truck contained two people in the cab and two more people sitting
in the back (R. 200). The truck was surrounded by several people
who scattered upon the officer's arrival (R. 200, 220) . The
officers, as a result of the information given by the juveniles
and the sudden scattering of people in the parking lot, concluded
that this was the truck from which the informants told them drugs
were sold (R. 200, 224).
The truck immediately left the parking lot (R. 201, 220).
The officers directed a nearby Trooper to effectuate a traffic
5

stop of the truck because the officer's car did not have the
necessary equipment to make the stop (R. 208, 214). The Trooper
pulled the truck over noticing two violations.

First, the

truck's tires exceeded the periphery of the vehicle without the
required mud flaps, and second the passengers were seated on the
side rather than the truck bed (R. 259). While the Trooper
warned the driver of the violations, the officers questioned
defendant who was a passenger in the truck bed (R. 208-09, 260).
The officers informed defendant that they had received a tip
that the individuals in the truck were selling drugs and asked
defendant if he had any drugs in his possession (R. 213, 22324).

Defendant became nervous and repeatedly put his hands into

his pockets even after the officers requested that he keep his
hands in view (R. 209, 213, 214). Worried about their safety,
the officers conducted a Terry pat-down search for weapons and
discovered a knife concealed in defendant's clothing (R. 76, 25556, 274-75).

A subsequent search incident to arrest uncovered

the drugs and drug paraphernalia from which the possession
charges stem (R. 76)•
Defendant moved the trial court to suppress the
evidence seized during the search, arguing that the officers did
not have reasonable suspicion to detain him (R. 40-41) . The

6

trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 73-80).
Defendant subsequently entered an unconditional guilty plea to
attempted possession of a control substance, a class A
misdemeanor and possession of a controlled substance, a class A
misdemeanor (R. 130-37).

Defendant was sentence to one year in

the Washington County Jail and ordered to pay a fine of $925.00.
The trial court stayed the sentence and placed defendant on three
years probation, including 120 days of house arrest (R. 3 02).
On April 17, 1996, defendant determined that house arrest
was unreasonable and voluntarily checked into the Washington
County Jail and requested the court modify his sentence (R. 3 0911).

The court resentenced defendant to 45 days of jail time (R.

311) .
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 165).
Defendant contacted his current counsel once from the Washington
County Jail and once after his release from jail.
Brief at 5.

Appellant's

Defendant alleged he had not received adequate

representation from prior counsel but failed to detail any
specific instances of deficient performance.

Id.

counsel has had no further contact with defendant.

Defendant's
Id.

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's appellate counsel has fulfilled the requirements
7

for an Anders brief to the extent possible under the
circumstances.

Counsel's Anders brief contains an adequate

factual summary and legal argument, supported with citations to
relevant authority, to support his conclusion that defendant
cannot make an argument on appeal that is not wholly frivolous.
Before abandoning contact with his attorney, defendant did not
articulate any specific basis for his appeal beyond a general
dissatisfaction with trial counsel's performance.

Therefore,

current counsel can only speculate as to the deficiencies upon
which defendant wishes to base this appeal.
Furthermore, defendant's appellate counsel correctly
concludes that defendant received effective assistance of
counsel.

Defendant was represented by two attorneys.

The

existing record indicates that the performance of both those
attorneys was objectively reasonable at all phases of the
proceedings.

Counsel can find nothing in the record to overcome

the strong presumption that trial counsel adequately represented
defendant.

Thus, any argument that defendant received

ineffective assistance of counsel must fail as wholly frivolous.
Finally, by entering an unconditional guilty plea, defendant
waived all pre-plea constitutional violations.

Nothing in the

record supports nor does defendant allege that the unconditional
8

guilty plea was not voluntary.

Consequently, any argument that

defendant was denied due process is similarly wholly frivolous.
Thus, this Court should dismiss defendant's appeal and grant
appellate counsel's motion to withdraw.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
MEEE£ AND
£l£nm
Defendant's brief complies with the requirements for an
Anders brief as set forth in State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 168, 170
(Utah 1981).

Clayton requires that an Anders brief contain the

following information:

xx

a statement of the facts, a description

of the proceedings and the citation of pertinent authorities
sufficient to permit this Court to fulfill its obligation . . .
a stipulation describing the trial proceedings pertinent to each
alleged error .„•••*' certification that [counsel furnished
indigent defendant with a copy of the brief] and

...

incorporat[ion], in as full detail as appropriate, any points the
indigent has raised with counsel."

id.

Defendant's brief contains a fact statement and an adequate
description of the proceedings. Appellant's Brief at 2-4.
Counsel then sets forth the binding legal authority which

9

demonstrates that defendant does not have an appealable issue of
any merit. Appellant's Brief at 4-7.
Counsel cannot fulfill the remaining requirements of Clayton
because counsel does not know the current whereabouts of
defendant and therefore cannot ascertain the exact basis upon
which defendant wished to lodge his appeal. Appellant's Brief at
5.

Counsel also cannot comply with the requirement of furnishing

defendant with a copy of the brief or include arguments defendant
wished to make.

Consequently, defendant's counsel has complied

with the requirements of Clayton to the extent possible.

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE COUNSEL CORRECTLY CONCLUDES THAT
DEFENDANT RECEIVED OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE TRIAL
REPRESENTATION AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel raised
for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.
v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1995).

State

However, when

reviewing counsel's performance, this Court must indulge in a
"strong presumption" that counsel's performance fell within the
"wide range of reasonable professional assistance."

State v.

lemBlin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) ( quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)).
On the existing record, defendant cannot overcome the strong
10

presumption of reasonable representation because the trial record
is devoid of any instances in which trial counsel deficiently
represented defendant.

In order to establish that counsel

represented him ineffectively, defendant must overcome that
strong presumption and show that "his counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, " and that,
but for the identified omissions or acts of trial counsel that
there, is a "reasonable probability" of a more favorable outcome.
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688 and 694, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 2064 and 2068 (1984); State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 173
(Utah App. 1993).
Two attorneys represented defendant prior to conviction.
The first attorney, David Maddox, represented defendant through
the suppression hearing.

Maddox moved to withdraw after

defendant failed to maintain contact or pay for services rendered
(R. 102-04).

Defendant's second attorney, LaMar Winward, then

entered an appearance and represented defendant through his
guilty plea and sentencing (R.

108, 112, 115, 118, 120-21, 129-

30, 149-50, 158).
Maddox' representation never fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

The sole issue in this case was the

admissibility of the contraband uncovered during the search of
11

defendant.

During the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress,

Maddox cross examined the officers pointing out inconsistencies
in their recollections of the type or color of the truck
defendant was riding in immediately prior to the seizure and
arguing that the truck did not fit the description provided by
the juvenile informants (R. 215, 233, 262, 273).
After he convinced the court that the questioning of the
truck's passengers exceeded the permitted scope of a legitimate
traffic stop (R. 271-73),

Maddox focused on whether the

questioning of defendant and the other passengers was supported
by reasonable suspicion (R. 232, 273). Maddox supported his
argument to the trial court that the questioning was not
supported by reasonable suspicion by directing the court to
relevant authority (R. 234)(directing the court to State v. Case.
884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) (holding police lacked reasonable
suspicion to detain defendant's vehicle when acting on
uncorroborated police bulletin) and State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d
761 (Utah 1991) (finding no reasonable suspicion that a car
passenger committed a crime when officers believed car was
stolen)).
After oral arguments on the motion to suppress the court
believed the issue needed written memoranda from both sides
12

I
i
i

before the court could come to a decision (R. 273). Maddox
timely submitted a written memorandum adequately supported with
citations to pertinent authority (R. 83-97).

Thus, Maddox

effectively represented defendant and his conduct never fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.1
Defendant's second attorney, LaMar Winward, was similarly
effective.

Winward's role was limited to arranging defendant's

plea bargain and representing defendant at sentencing (R. 295-96,
299-306, 309-11).

Winward continued to represent defendant

despite defendant's failure to maintain contact with him (R. 122,
129, 130, 291). Winward explained defendant's guilty plea to him
and believed that defendant fully understood the plea (R. 136).
Winward also carefully directed the trial court's attention to
all relevant mitigating factors during the sentencing procedure
(R. 300-01).

In defendant's own words, Mr. Winward, "said it

all" (R. 301). Ultimately, Mr. Winward succeeded in reducing a
second degree felony, a third degree felony, and a class A
misdemeanor to two class A misdemeanors.

Respite trial counsel's efforts, the court denied
defendant's motion to suppress because it concluded that the
officer's observations coupled with the tip from the informants
provided reasonable suspicion for the officer's to question the
truck's passengers (R. 73-80).
13

On this record, defendant cannot overcome the strong
presumption of reasonable representation, and this court should
find that trial counsel adequately represented defendant.

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE DEFENDANT
VOLUNTARILY WAIVED ALL PRE-PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS
Defendant waived all pre-plea constitutional violations by
entering an unconditional guilty plea.

An unconditional guilty

plea waives all appealable issues with the exception of the
voluntariness of the guilty plea, including the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

State v. Sery, 758

P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah 1988); State v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566,
567 (Utah App. 1994).

Defendant was adequately informed of his

right to appeal upon conviction, his right to have the State pay
for his appeal if defendant was indigent and his right to
assistance of counsel on such appeal, as well as all other
constitutional rights under the State and Federal Constitutions
(R. 131-33).

Defendant has not alleged nor does the record

indicate that defendant did not voluntarily enter his guilty plea
(R. 134). On the contrary, defendant clearly indicated that he
entered the plea voluntarily.

He was not coerced, threatened, or

promised anything in return for his guilty plea (idl.
14

Thus, all

other issues are deemed waived.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing arguments and defendant's Anders
brief, this Court should unanimously conclude that defendant's
arguments are wholly frivolous and without merit. As a result,
this Court should dismiss defendant's appeal and grant his
counsel's motion to withdraw.

t*6

Respectfully submitted this

rv

day of July, 1997

Jan Graham
Attorney General

Thomas B. Brunker
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet.
History: C. 1953, 58-S7-7.5, enacted by L.
1995, ch. 333, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1995, ch. 333, § 4
makes the act effective on July 1,1995.

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealedfromthose present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
240
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58-37-8

substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through
OXaXvii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, orftirnishany record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by
this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source,fraud,forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications tinder
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, 6ports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less thanfiveyears if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another 6tate for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to ¥2 the maximum sentence imposed by law
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection
supersedes Section 77-18-4.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to tfre defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether, the defendant admits or
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, whichfindingisfinal,except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following thefindingsby the court,
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb).
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section
76-3-203.5.
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans,fromprescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances orfromcausing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, f 8; 1972, ch. 22,
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12,fi 5; 1985,
ch* 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, fi 1; 1987, ch. 92,
fi 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, fi 1;
1989, ch. 50, fi 2; 1989, ch. 56, fi 1; 1989, ch.
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, fi 1;
1990, ch. 161, fi 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990,
ch. 163, ( 3; 1991, ch. 80, fi 1; 1991, ch. 198,
fi 4; 1991, ch. 268, fi 7; 1995, ch. 284, fi 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added the last
sentence in Subsection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-

section (9Xd) which read "Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002."
Cross-References. — Cities and towns, prohibitions of sales of narcotics to minors, § 108-47.
Psychotoxic chemical solvents, penalties for
use or sale, { 76-10-101 et seq.
Sentencing for felonies, fi§ 7p-3-201, 76-3203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, fi§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSXS

Constitutionality.
Accomplice testimony.
Admissibility of evidence.
Applicability of exemptions.
Arranging sale.
Charging offense.
—Generally.
—Jury instructions.
Conflicting penalties.
Conspiracy provision.
Counterfeit substances.
Defense of agency.
Distribution.
—Arranging to distribute.
—Distribution for value.
Drug-free zones.
Entrapment.
Evidence.
Evidence sufficient to show intent to distribute.
Forgery of prescription.

Incomplete sale.
Information.
Intent to obtain narcotics by fraud.
Jury instruction.
Obtaining possession.
Possession.
—Amount.
Possession of marijuana.
Production of marijuana.
Production or manufacture.
Qualifications of states witness.
•Sale.11

Search and seizure.
Sentencing.
—Enhancement for prior conviction.
—Proximity to school.
Sufficiency of evidence.
—Connection between defendant and offense.
—Constructive possession.
—Production of marijuana.
—Testimony of paid informant.
—Use of maryuana.
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History: L. 1981, ch. 76, * 4.
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses,
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq.

58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: L. 1981, eh. 76, § 5.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act* means Laws 1981, ch. 76, §§ 1 to 6, which
enacted §§ 58-37a-1 to 58-37a-6.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Unt

j? '
. .
Search and seizure.
Intent.
Where the buyer of drug paraphernalia only
intended to use the items as evidence in a
subsequent criminal prosecution of the seller, it
was factually and legally impossible for the
defendant to have known that items sold would
be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy,
674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983).
Search and seizure.
The smell of marijuana emanating from a

private residence provides law enforcement offinals with probable cause to conduct a search
of the premises. State v. South, 985 P.2d 795
^Uk C t ^
1994)
Although the plain smell doctrine provides
officers probable cause to believe contraband or
evidence of a crime may be found, it does not
automatically provide officers with exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of a
private residence. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
_ Cited in State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah
CtApp. 1993).

58-3 7a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights.
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right
can exist in it.
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